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Preliminary observation suggests that the contact between Israeli
officials and newly arrived immigrants from traditional societies is considerably less "bureaucratic" than might have been predicted. For
example, analysis of several cases of such bureaucrat-client relationships
indicates that officials often add the role of teacher to their relatively
specific roles as bureaucrats by teaching newcomers how to perform
in the role. Moreover, the official often becomes not only a teacher
but also a kind of informal leader. This indicates that under certain
conditions, formal organizations may give birth to incipient social
movements, a direction of organizational change wholly unanticipated
in the theoretical literature. The case material is analyzed in terms of
(1) a theory of role impingement in which bureaucratic roles are seen to
become intertwined with roles that are bureaucratically irrelevant to
the conduct of formal organization and (2) a theory of socialization
where the official serves as socializing agent for his clients.
Elihu Katz is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at
the University of Chicago; S. N. Eisenstadt is professor of sociology and
chairman of the department in the Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics
and Social Sciences, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.'
'This paper is a by-product of a collaborative effort to design research on the
developing bureaucratic framework of immigrant absorption in Israel. In 1957-1958
a research seminar on this topic was conducted by the authors at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Participating in the seminar, and in the pilot study that
emerged from it, were the following faculty members and students: Rivka Bar-Yossef,
Batsheva Bonn6, Esther Carmeli, Nina Toren, Arie Eliav, Uri Horowitz, Rivka
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THIS paper has its origin in preliminary observations on the patterns of contact between Israeli organizations and recent immigrants from non-Western countries. The pilot study resulting from
these observations is concerned, first with "the socialization of the
client," that is, with the adaptation of newcomers from traditional
familistic backgrounds to new role expectations such as those
implicit in becoming a factory worker, a hospital patient, a client
of a social welfare worker, or even a bus passenger. Secondly, the
study is equally concerned with the changes that occur in the
organizations themselves in response to the large influx of clients
new to Western ways. It is to preliminary reflection on this second
problem that the present paper is devoted.
Rather than consider the organization as a whole, we are restricting our focus to those officials having direct dealings with new
immigrants. We are concerned, in other words, with the officialclient relationship where the official is usually of European birth or
parentage and where the client is a recent immigrant from a nonWestern country.
According to sociological theory, there was good reason to
expect that the rapid influx of large numbers of new immigrants
would increase the bureaucratization of the organizations to which
they came.2 This meant that one could expect, first, an increasing
impersonality of relations between bureaucrats and clients.3 One
could also expect an increase in the degree of universalismequality before the law-in the orientation of bureaucrat toward
client. Similarly, the pressure of work resulting from the large
influx ought to make the official more stringent in his enforcement
of the rules. And, of course, one could expect official-client relations to become more businesslike and specific, becoming more
narrowly limited to officially relevant concerns. Finally, one
Kaplansky, Yael Lissak, Pnina Morag, Dorit Pedan, Ozer Schild, Dov Weintraub,
and Rina Zabelevsky. Mr. Schild and Mrs. Bar-Yossef are currently directing the
pilot study, which is being supported, in part, by the Ford Foundation. We are
indebted to Professors Peter M. Blau and David Riesman for a critical reading of an
earlier draft.
2An elaboration of the well-known Simmel hypothesis on the effects of the size of
a group for the specific case of migration can be found in Frank E. Jones, A Sociological Perspective on Immigrant Adjustment, Social Forces, 35 (1956), 39-47.
"In general, our use of the terms official (or bureaucrat) and client is meant to
refer also to superior-subordinate relationships within an organization.
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could expect the official to rely more heavily on the ascribed
authority of his office and on the symbols and the power accompanying it to get his job done.4
These are some of the dimensions in which we expected to find
changes in the official-client relationship as a result both of the
large and rapid increase of clients and of the tensions arising
from the radical cultural differences between officials and clients.
We found such examples, of course, but we also found many
examples of change in exactly the opposite direction. Rather than
a marked increase in the degree of bureaucratization in officialclient relations, we found evidence of debureaucratization. We
often found officials relating to clients personally, taking sympathetic account of the status "new immigrant", and not confining
themselves to their officially relevant roles. And frequently we
found officials trying to get their job done, not so much by means
of the power and symbols of office, but on the basis of exchange of
services, or persuasion, or personal charisma.
In the pages that follow, we shall try to explain how such
relationships appear to arise. But it is important to bear in mind
that these are, so far, only impressionistic observations. The pilot
study and, ultimately, the full-scale research, we hope, will be
better founded.
THEORY AND RESEARCH ON BUREAUCRATIZATION
In the broadest sense, the theoretical problem here deals with
the conditions affecting the degree of bureaucratization of an
organization, specifically of the bureaucrat-client relationship. We
are interested in the factors that make for varying degrees of
bureaucratization as well as the factors (presumably the same ones)
that influence the direction of organizational change. Indeed,
in the writings of Max Weber and Robert Michels the problem
of organizational change is essentially identical with the theme of
bureaucratization.5 If the classical sociological writings were con4Here and elsewhere we make use of Parsons' terminology. Although we make an
effort to communicate the meaning of the several concepts we employ, for a full
discussion see Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, 1951), ch. ii.
5Max Weber, "The Presuppositions and Causes of Bureaucracy," in Robert K.
Merton, Ailsa P. Gray, Barbara Hockey, and Hanan Selvin, eds., Reader in
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cerned with bureaucratization, the later writings have devoted
themselves to the problems of overbureaucratization. Thus, discussions of deviations from the ideal-type bureaucracy outlined
by Weber focused on overbureaucratization as a threat to the
attainment of the very goals for which the organizations were
established. The leading character in these discussions, the official
who converts means into ends, has been frequently described both
in literary and scientific publications. The same is true for the
accompanying manifestations of exaggerated hierarchy and red
tape.,

Recently, however, with the beginning of empirical research
on organizational behavior, these assumptions about the unidirectional evolution of organizations have been put into broader perspective. Thus, recent empirical research seems to suggest that (1)
the trend toward total bureaucratization of organizations may
sometimes be averted;7 (2) actual bureaucracies are compounded of
nonbureaucratic elements also;8 (3) bureaucracies, once established, are by no means unchanging;9 and (4) when changes do
Bureaucracy (Glencoe, 1952), 60-68. Of course, Weber was also concerned with the
role of internal factors making for a greater degree of bureaucratization in the
organization, a notable example being his discussion of "The Routinization of
Charisma," which tends to develop when a group faces the problem of leadership
succession, ibid., pp. 92-100. This also gives a brief statement of Robert Michels'
argument (pp. 88-92), as does his Political Parties (Glencoe, 1949).
"The best known of these essays is probably Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic
Structure and Personality," in Merton et al., op. cit., pp. 361-371.
7Seymour M. Lipset, Martin A. Trow and James S. Coleman, Union Democracy
(Glencoe, 1956), try to specify the conditions that contribute, in at least one case,
to the maintenance of trade-union democracy rather than oligarchic bureaucracy.
8This, of course, refers to the dominant trend of present-day research, which has
been concerned with the existence and the functions of informal social relations in
the context of formal organization. But more important for our present purpose is
the incipient concern for informal aspects of relationships between bureaucrats and
the public. See, for example, Morris Janowitz, Deil Wright, and William Delany,
Public Administration and the Public (Ann Arbor, 1958); Edwin J. Thomas, Role
Conceptions and Organizational Size, American Sociological Review, 24 (1959), 3037; and George F. Lombard, Behavior in a Selling Group (Cambridge, Mass., 1955).
For a recent critique of the assumption that the several elements of Weber's idealtype bureaucracy are necessarily intercorrelated, see Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "Bureaucracy" and "Rationality" in Weber's Organization Theory, American Sociological
Review, 24 (1959), 792-795.
9See Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago, 1955), esp. ch. iii.

ISRAELI

ORGANIZATIONS

117

take place, they are not always in the direction of greater bureaucratization and formalism.10

FactorsAffecting Bureaucratizationin the Official-Client
Relationship
The literature provides a number of suggestions concerning
the factors affecting bureaucratization in general. Weber's emphasis has already been noted.11 Succession is another familiar example. When a new director takes over from a predecessor, he has
little choice but to insist on relatively greater formal relations, to
demand adherence to the appointed channels of communication,
and the like.12Another factor is monopolization. When an organization has a monopoly on certain goods or services (as most public
bureaucracies have, of course), there is little chance of effective
protest on the part of the client and no possibility of recourse to
a competitor; under such conditions, bureaucrats may permit
themselves an attitude of detachment and ritualistic formalism
vis-?-vis their clients.13
The reverse of each of these influences should be associated with
a lesser degree of bureaucratization. Thus, a smaller organization
or one which suffers a reduction in size ought to be less bureaucratic. So should an organization that is aware that its clients have
a choice between it and a competitor.
Each of these factors, of course, has its impact on the officialclient or the superior-subordinate relationships.14 But there are
other factors worth singling out for their specific impact on these
relationships. It is well known, for example, that soldiers in combat relate to others and to their officersin a much less bureaucratic
way than they do behind the front lines or in peacetime.15Closely
'0See Ralph H. Turner, "The Navy Disbursing Officer as a Bureaucrat," in
Merton et al. op. cit., pp. 372-379. Also compare Blau, op. cit., for an example of
the way in which variations in supervisory practice affected the extent to which
employment agency officials used racial bias vis-lh-vis their clients.
"Max Weber, "The Presuppositions and Causes of Bureaucracy," in Merton et al.
op. cit., pp. 60-68.
"2SeeAlvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (Glencoe, 1954), pp.
59-101.
12See Merton, op. cit., p. 369.
"4Fora discussion of the effect of size, see Thomas, op. cit.
15Samuel A. Stouffer, et al. The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath
(Princeton, 1949), p. 100.
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related findings emerge from a study of the informal social organization that superseded the formal organization of a naval unit
on a tiny, unpopulated Pacific island.16Similarly, workers on the
night shift were treated differently by their supervisors than were
day-shift employees,17just as, in Gouldner's study, workers in the
mine successfully resisted greater bureaucratization while office
workers in the same company did not.'8 The common elements
in these situations would seem to be the relative danger or unusualness of the task, the relative isolation from social contacts outside the organization, and relative independence from the immediate presence of upper echelons in the hierarchy. One suspects
that certain of these factors would also be appropriate to cases such
as Diamond's study of the debureaucratization of a quasi-military
group by early American settlers organized as the Virginia Company.19

As a final example of debureaucratization, Turner's study of the
navy disbursing officer during wartime will serve particularly
well.20 Turner indicated several factors that influenced these officers to depart from the orientation prescribed by the rule book
to establish more diffuse relations with some of their clients and
to show favoritism. First, many clients of the disbursing officer
were his superiors in rank and, consequently, his superiors in other
role relationships. Secondly, he found it advantageous to help
others who could reciprocate, such as the mess officer.This dependence, in part a function of his isolation from other social contacts,
was embedded in a more general interdependence created by the
war.2' Finally, client and bureaucrat were dependent on each
other because, especially during the war, the higher authorities
who were to be consulted in case of doubt were both physically
and psychologically distant.
This dependence of clients and officials on each other appears
as a key factor in the other cases as well, and for much the same
"Charles H. Page, Bureaucracy's Other Face, Social Forces, 25 (1946), 89-91.
"Lipset et al., op. cit., p. 139.
"Gouldner, op. cit., pp. 105-154.
19Sigmund Diamond, From Organization to Society: Virginia in the 17th Century,
American Journal of Sociology, 63 (1958), 588-594.
2OTurner, op. cit.
"'For example, Turner omits the interdependence based on the common danger.
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reasons.22The danger, the isolation, the aborted hierarchy of combat, the night shift, the mine, the Virginia Company, and the
naval unit on the Pacific island made men dependent upon each
other over and above the specific relations defined for them by
their formal organizations. The attempt to enforce ordinary peacetime or daytime relations under such circumstances-that is, the
attempt to behave in the accepted bureaucratic manner, or even
more, to be overbureaucratic-is what apparently leads to desertion (where one is able to leave) or to mutiny (where one cannot).
Role Impingement as a Characterization of Bureaucratization
and Debureaucratization
The notion of dependence may be viewed sociologically as a
special case of the impingement of other role relationships on a
given bureaucratic relationship. In Turner's study, for example,
the observed debureaucratization could be considered a product
of the regularized contacts in other roles that existed between the
disbursing officer and his clients. Moreover, if debureaucratization
may be characterized in terms of the impingement of nonbureaucratic roles on bureaucratic ones, then overbureaucratization may
be characterized as either the formalistic segregation of a bureaucratic relationship from all other role relations (even relevant ones)
or, in its totalitarian form, as the imposition of the bureaucratic
relationship on relations outside the scope of the bureaucracy.
The bureaucratic ritualist would be an example of one who arbitrarily views all extrabureaucratic roles as irrelevant to the conduct
of his office, while the totalitarian bureaucrat "takes his authority
home," as, for example, the sergeant bullying his men off duty.
In effect, overbureaucratization and debureaucratization represent a disturbance in the relationship between an organization and
its environment that is not envisioned by the classical model of
bureaucracy. This model envisages the roles of both bureaucrat
and client as segregated to some extent from their other roles;
their roles are "specific" to the interaction setting and in this
bureaucratic setting it is irrelevant, for example, that both bureau"Note again that we are using "bureaucrat-client" in a generic sense, implying
superordinate-subordinate relations (such as in combat, the mine, the Virginia Company, etc.) as well.

120

ADMINISTRATIVE

SCIENCE

QUARTERLY

crat and client belong to the same political club. However, even in
the ideal-type bureaucracy a role is not completely independent of
other roles; some outside roles clearly may be, or must be, considered. If an old man, obviously unable to wait his turn in a long
queue, is given special attention by a clerk, this is not a case of an
irrelevant role relationship being allowed incorrectly to impinge
on the bureaucrat-client relationship. In general, the classic model
of bureaucracy requires only that the bureaucratic organization
not be directly dependent on external factors for its manpower, its
resources, or its motivation for carrying out its organizational
task. If an organization relies directly upon any one segment of
the population for financing, or for political protection, these
sources of support will clearly receive particularistic attention in
the dispensation of the organization's services. It is such direct
dependence that mechanisms such as boards of trustees, budget
bureaus, and the like try to avert by insulating bureaucratic
organizations from their sources of support. What is true for the
organization as a whole is true for its members as well. If a bureaucrat receives direct rewards from outside the organization in addition to, or instead of, his rewards from within, obviously his independence of action as a bureaucrat is thereby reduced.23
Clearly, then, there is a very delicate balance-varying from
organization to organization-between the specific roles defined
as relevant to relations within the bureaucracy and those outside
roles defined as irrelevant. Note the parallel to our notion of role
impingement in Gouldner's concept of "latent identity.P"24
23To cite a familiar example, a civil servant looking to a political party for
rewards for his performance in his role as civil servant may do so because he is a
political appointee, because he is ideologically committed to his party, or for other
reasons.
WAfterdeveloping this analysis of role impingement, we encountered Gouldner's
concept and noted its close similarity. "It is necessary to distinguish," says Gouldner,
"between those social identities of group members which are consensually regarded
as relevant to them in a given setting and those which group members define as
being irrelevant, inappropriate to consider, or illegitimate to take into account.
The former can be called the manifest social identities, the latter, the latent social
identities .... When group members orient themselves to the latent identities of
others in their group, they are involved in a relationship with them which is not
culturally prescribed by the group norms governing their manifest roles .... It
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ISRAELI OFFICIALS AND NEW IMMIGRANTS
Increasingly, in recent years, the contact between immigrants
and the new societies to which they have come are mediated by professionals and bureaucrats. The customs agent, the social worker,
the policeman, the public health nurse, the housing administrator,
-andthe like, constitute the immigrants' main connections with the
community to which they come, and it is these officials who provide aid and advice, which in earlier migrations were obtained
more informally or not at all. This change is characteristic not
only of the reception of immigrants in present-day Israel but also
of the reception of Puerto Ricans and southern Negroes in New
York and Chicago, and of other immigrant groups in the areas
receiving them.25 This change is in part a consequence of the
greater bureaucratization of these areas in the last generation and
in part a consequence of the theory and practice of the welfare
state which, adapting itself to the immigrant, proffers many social
services unknown to the immigrant of an earlier generation. In
Israel, this change is also a consequence of the different pattern of
motivation and different demographic composition of present-day
would seem clear that latent identities and roles are important because they exert
pressure upon the manifest roles, often impairing conformity with their requirements and endemically threatening the equilibrium of the manifest role system."
Gouldner goes on to give an example concerning deference to elders in a universalistic setting which is very similar to the one we have presented. See Alvin W.
Gouldner, Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles,
I and II, Administrative Science Quarterly, 2 (1957-1958), 281-306 and 444-480, esp.
pp. 282-287. It should be noted also that the problem of role impingement or
latent social identity differs from the problem of role conflict. Role impingement
refers to the multiple role relations played by official and client vis-a-vis one another.
Role conflict generally implies the multiple (and conflicting) roles of a given actor
vis-h-vis several different others-e.g., the official's relationships to his wife and to
his boss. Still a further distinction, recently introduced by Merton, is that of the
role set, which has to do with the multiple role relations implicit in any given role
-e.g., the official's relationship to his boss, his secretary, his colleagues, etc. Others
who have employed analytic concepts similar to the concept of role impingement
are Lloyd Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy (Cambridge, Eng., 1957); Frank Jones, "The
Infantry Recruit: A Sociological Analysis of Socialization in the Canadian Army"
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard, 1956); and Thomas, op. cit.
26A review, by Nathan Glazer, of several recent books treating Puerto Rican
migration makes this point; see New York's Puerto Ricans, Commentary, 26 (1958),
469478.
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immigrants compared with the "pioneer" immigrants of the turn
of the century.26
The remainder of this paper is devoted to a preliminary discussion of some of the problems arising out of the contact between
immigrants to Israel and the officials with whom they deal, viewed
against the theoretical considerations set forth in the first part of
this paper. The kind of immigrant with whom we are particularly
concerned comes from non-Western countries (such as Yemen,
Morocco, Iraq, and so on), where he is likely to have had little
or no contact with formal organization.
The question to which we now turn is why so many of the
official-client relations observed seemed to be moving in the direction of lesser bureaucratization. We do not mean to imply that
Israeli organizations prior to the influx of the non-Western immigrants were close approximations of the Weberian ideal-type; for
the small size of the country and the common struggle made for
wide networks of interpersonal relations embracing officials and
clients alike. The pioneering and egalitarian ideologies frowned
on status differentiation, differential distribution of rewards, as
well as on formalities of all sorts. Not least important, political
parties exerted considerable influence on appointments to and
conduct of the public bureaucracies.
As we have already said, the mere increase in organizational size
and responsibility might have been expected to result in increased
bureaucratization of relations between official and client, between
supervisor and worker, and so forth. To this rapid increase in
numbers add the divergence of cultural background between the
majority of recent immigrants coming from non-Western countries
and the European bureaucrats dealing with them, and one would
certainly expect an increase in bureaucratic formalism.27
Yet our preliminary observations indicate that this is not the
case. We have, of course, found some evidence of increasing
bureaucratization as a response to the influx of new immigrants.
26See S. N. Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants (Glencoe, 1955), pp. 6468, and 172 ff., "The Framework of Bureaucratic Absorption."
27In 1948, at the time of the establishment of the state of Israel, persons born in
Africa and Asia constituted 15 per cent of the population; five years later, in 1953,
they constituted 38 per cent of the population. See Moshe Sicron, Immigration to
Israel: 1948-1953 (Jerusalem, 1957), pp. 43-50.
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Thus, in one co-operative organization, for example, the hierarchy
became sharply elongated. Previously any member was able to
reach the highest official of the organization rather directly and
informally, nor was it particularly important whether he
brought his problem to one or another of the top officials. Now,
the same organization has developed a strict chain of command
and a new immigrant with a problem must proceed strictly
through the established channels and talk only to the relevant
official. Yet, even in this organization, as far as the actual interaction between official and client is concerned, there is evidence
of considerable debureaucratization.
Repeatedly, however, we have found in institutions as diverse
as health clinics and bus companies, widespread evidence of debureaucratization in the relationship between officials and new
immigrants. We have found cases where the official has assigned
himself a greater number of tasks vis-a-vis his clients than those
assigned him by his organization. We find considerable evidence
of the growth of personal relationships between officials and new
immigrants. We have even found cases where the official becomes
the leader of a kind of "social movement" composed of new immigrants, thus completely reversing the expected trend which is supposed to lead from movements to bureaucracy. A major key to
this unanticipated phenomenon is the notion of dependence we
have developed, which takes quite a different form at this point.
We shall try to describe what we think we have found and, in part,
we shall do this in terms of case studies. In one case, officials
assumed a teaching role vis-a-vis their clients. In another, officials
departed from their prescribed role as agents of socialization in
certain patterned ways. In the third case, officials became the leaders of an incipient social movement.

Bureaucrats as Teachers: Dependence on the Client's
Performance of His Role
The most characteristic form of debureaucratization in the
relationship between bureaucrats and new immigrants in Israel
is the assumption by the bureaucrat of the role of teacher along
with (or at the expense of) his other functions. Consider, for
example, the bus driver who gets out of the bus to teach the idea
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of a queue-"first come, first served" -an idea which is new to
many of his new immigrant passengers. Similarly, the nurse at the
well-baby clinic may be seen teaching women, informally, which of
their needs are appropriate to the health services and which
should be taken to other organizations. Or, the manager of the
government-subsidized grocery in the new immigrant settlement
may take the initiative and go into homes to teach housewives how
to prepare certain foods with which they have had no previous
experience.

In all these examples, the bureaucrat takes the time and effort
to teach a client something about his (the bureaucrat's) expectations concerning how the client role is to be played. In other
words, the bureaucrat teaches the client how to be a client so that
he (the bureaucrat) can go on being a bureaucrat. This, it seems
to us, is a form of dependence, but one which we have not considered so far; it is dependence on the client to act in a way which
makes it possible for the bureaucrat to do his job.
In other words, it is expected by the bureaucrat and the bureaucracy that the client will bring with him to the bureaucratic context
certain knowledge of expected roles from "outside," even though
he may have had no previous contact with this particular bureaucracy. In Western society, for example, one is prepared for one's
first encounter with a customs inspector by virtue of one's singlepurpose relationships with other officials, tradesmen, and the like.
When this preparation is lacking, the bureaucrat himself, in the
examples cited, added a dimension-teaching-to
his relationship
And
the
client.
this
is
with
change an example of debureaucratization both because it adds another role to the specifically prescribed
one and because the quality of interaction in the teacher-student
relationship necessarily impinges on the more formal bureaucratclient relationship. Yet these are the very elements which are
officially alien to the ideal-type bureaucracy.28What is more, as we
shall presently see, the teaching relationship may bring further
debureaucratization, although conceivably it may simply permit
the bureaucrat to perform his role as originally prescribed.
-"This would be particularly true when a bureaucrat's aim is to bring his client
to want the bureaucrat's services; thus, this might be more true of a storekeeper
than a nurse, and more true of a nurse than a bus driver.
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Consider the case of the bus driver. Introductory texts in sociology like to cite the driver-passengerrelationship as an example of a
purely instrumental, secondary relationship. Neither party matters
to the other as an individual. One would not expect the bus
driver to modify his behavior vis-a-vis new immigrants or anybody
else, yet our preliminary observations seem to indicate that he
does. Like other bureaucrats who come into contact with new
immigrants, the bus driver tends to assume a teaching role, too.
Besides trying to teach the idea of queuing, bus drivers were
observed trying to persuade immigrant passengers that the cost of
a ride on one bus was the same as the cost on the bus that had
just gone by, or that the driver did not personally profit from each
fare he collected, or that the decision for the bus to leave the
terminal was not his. The consequences of the formal organization of a bus company that are understood by client and bureaucrat in modern society are simply not "obvious" to the non-Western immigrant.
Moreover, we have the impression-and the research now in
progress will permit confirmation-that a kind of joking relationship grows up between drivers and new-immigrant passengers.
This seems to be the case particularly where the passengers in the
bus know one another-as in buses serving suburban settlements
and city neighborhoods populated largely by new immigrants. Indeed, drivers on routes with concentrations of new immigrants
have told us explicitly that they consider it desirable to get to
know their passengers personally, because a new driver is likely
to encounter "trouble" with non-Western immigrants, who may
become unruly or begin to ask the usual questions anew: "How
much is the fare?" "May I get off here?" and so on. In fact, we
have had some indication that the bus companies recognize the
desirability of less frequent changes of drivers on lines serving new
immigrants. This "personalization" of the bureaucratic relationship represents a deviation from the impersonal, universalistic,
specific relationship between driver and passenger which, in principle, ought to be unaffected by the substitution of one driver for
another. It is an example of debureaucratization, which is the
product of the dependence of the bureaucrat on the client's ability
and motivation to perform his role as client.
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It is important to note, however, that an official's dependence
on the client to perform his role is probably of a different order
from the kinds of dependence we discussed in the other examples
reviewed in the first part of this paper. In the earlier examples, the
client actually had power over the bureaucrat-he could affect
his well-being both as a member of the bureaucratic organization
and as an individual. Thus, the clients of the disbursing officer
were his superiors in other relationships, or the men in combat or
in the mine could withdraw their reciprocal protection of their
superior. In the present instance, however, the passenger has power
over the driver in very much the same sense that a baby has power
to disrupt the family schedule, and clearly this creates dependence
of quite a different order.29

Bureaucratsas Socializing Agents
The process of a bureaucrat stepping outside his role to teach
a new immigrant how to act his role as client is highly reminiscent
of the processes of socialization and social control as analyzed by
Parsons.80In the socialization of the child, or in the process of psychotherapy, the socializing agent steps out of his place in the larger
social system and assumes a role in the "deviant" subsystem.
Thus, the mother is a member of the inclusive family system consisting of father, mother, and children. To bring a new child into
this more inclusive system, she must use her role in the earlier
mother-child subsystem and selectively reward the child for obedience and disobedience to the new expectations of the inclusive
system while at the same time providing a basis of support for the
child in his effort to learn the new role. At times, however, the
mother may fail as socializing agent, because she herself prefers
29Replying to the query whether the "dependency" of the child does not sometimes confer power equal to or superior to that of the person on whom dependency
exists, Parsons distinguishes between power defined as "relative importance in
carrying out the functional performance of the system" and as the "ability to cause
trouble by threatening to disrupt the system." In this latter sense, "the child, and
other persons or groups in dependent positions have considerable 'power.'" See
Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, Family, Socialization and Interaction Process
(Glencoe, 1955), p. 46, n. 18. It is this second type of power which concerns us at
this point.
'0lbid., ch. ii.
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to remain in the "deviant" subsystem and, ignoring the father and
the rest of the family, acts to "keep the child for herself."
The parallel seems striking to us. The assumption of a teaching
role by the bureaucrat and the "personalizing" of the bureaucratclient relationship seems to function for the process of immigrant
socialization as does the behavior of the socializing agent vis-a-vis
the child. One of the objects of our empirical study will be to
determine whether this kind of bureaucratic behavior (whatever
its dysfunctions for the organizational routine) contributes more
to the adaptation of the new immigrant than the unbending
bureaucrat-client relationship.
Even more striking, perhaps, is the parallel to the kind of
mother who "keeps the child for herself." Thus, a bureaucrat who
has assumed a teaching role may fail to bring the new immigrant
client to play the role expected of him by the bureaucracy and
may, instead, remain a member of the "deviant" subsystem. This
possibility is most conspicuous perhaps in the case of the village
instructors who are assigned to each new settlement of immigrants. These instructors are part of a regional Settlement Authority which, in turn, is part of a nationwide Settlement Department. Sometimes, instead of mediating between the new immigrants and the authorities, the instructor becomes so much a part
of his village community that his major effort is devoted to "representing" the interests of his clients vis-at-visthe authorities.
The village instructor typically lives among his clients and is
potentially available all day long. His job, as compared with the
bus driver's, is a highly diffuse one and includes teaching the settlers, who were semiskilled craftsmen or peddlers, to be farmers,
co-operators (as this is understood in the moshav)31and Israelis.
In this case debureaucratization is manifested not merely in the
establishment of informal relations, but rather in the surrendering
of part of the bureaucrat's commitment to his bureaucracy in
31See S. N. Eisenstadt, Sociological Aspects of the Economic Adaptation of
Oriental Immigrants in Israel: A Case Study of Modernization, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 4 (1958), 269-278; and Alex Weingrod, From the Millah
to the Moshav: Culture Contact and Change in a New-Immigrant Village in Israel
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1959).
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favor of acceptance of a role in the system which he is expected
to change.
Of course, this is only one of the ways that the instructorgiven his highly diffuse and flexible role-can shape his relations
with his clients. Some instructors, obviously, take quite the opposite position. Their control of the resources necessary for the very
existence of their clients permits them to move in the direction
of overbureaucratization. They may interfere in matters'-religious
observance, for example-which ought properly to be outside their
(very broad) spheres of influence.
An even more complicating factor is that the instructor, apart
from his bureaucratic role, is often eager to make his clients fullfledged members of the nationwide small-holders co-operative
movement or even of his political party, and to have them identify
with its ideology, participate in its activities, and so on. Among the
instructors who play this double role-which is by no means
always considered illegitimate by the upper echelon of the Settlement Authority-many tend to view the various aspects of their
bureaucratic role of training immigrants in agriculture and administration as a means to the end of full citizenship. This goal, for
the ideologically oriented Israeli, implies the assumption of political and ideological commitments. Such instructors aim at making
their clients members of a solidary movement of which they themselves are a part. This subsidiary aim makes the instructor even
more dependent on the settlers. They may easily threaten not to
participate in the movement unless the instructor provides them
with various benefits and allocations for which he is the intermediary, though these may not be their due. In response the
instructor may either move in the direction of debureaucratization
and succumb to these demands, or he may attempt to use his
bureaucratic position to force the clients to assume the political
and ideological roles he envisages for them.

Bureaucratsas Leaders
A bureaucrat serving as "representative" or as "organizer" of
his clients is by no means the extreme example of the kind of
debureaucratization which may result from the bureaucrat's assumption of the role of socializing agent. Sometimes bureaucrats
become charismatic leaders of groups of their clients.
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Consider, for example, the case of several nurses employed
at a well-baby clinic in a relatively segregated immigrants' "transitional community" within one of the major cities. In this setting
the nurse-like the village instructor-is expected to be a teacher
and to establish the kind of relationship required for successful
teaching. Thus, along with the curative and preventive medicine
practiced in such clinics, she must teach the women how to care
for themselves and for their children in the particular manner
prescribed by the modern scientific and philosophical orientation
of the well-baby clinic. The authority of the nurses observed, however, extended beyond these rather broadly defined functions.
They became generalized counselors and the clinic soon took on
the air of a kind of social center where women gathered to greet
each other, to gossip, and to move within the orbit of the nurses.
Some of the nurses had become preoccupied with the position
of women in non-Western families. Apparently, this particular
problem had first attracted attention as a result of the frequently
negative reactions of their clients' husbands to one or another of
the practices recommended by the clinic. Having thus become
sensitized to the subordinate role of their clients within their
families, the nurses added the reconciliation of family conflict to
their counseling efforts and, in fact, some of the nurses considered
it part of their job to teach women their "rights" vis-at-vistheir
husbands. In several instances, we have even heard nurses recommending divorce to their clients! Step by step, then, these nurses
seem to have moved out from their broad but relatively welldefined functions (which include teaching) to assume an even
broader teaching and counseling role and, in some instances, to
leadership of a kind of "suffragette"movement among their clients.
In such cases, the leader does not appear averse to illustrating her
message with reference to her own private life or that of her
friends. And to the extent that they follow, the clients look to their
leaders for active support and guidance, and to sharing in the consequences of their behavior.
The leadership role, as played by the bureaucrat, represents a
considerable degree of debureaucratization. It represents, in part,
exchange of the authority vested in the bureaucratic office for the
"voluntary" loyalty of clients; that is, such leadership exists not

130

ADMINISTRATIVE

SCIENCE

QUARTERLY

only by virtue of an "appointment" but by virtue of being
"chosen" by followers as well. To that extent, the bureaucrat must
submit himself to the authority, and to some of the norms, of his
followers. Moreover, he has considerably extended the sphere of
his influence from the specific tasks assigned to him to the wider,
more diffuse, tasks inherent in the leadership role.
DIRECTION OF FUTURE RESEARCH
The variety of official relations with new immigrants in Israel
provides us with a unique opportunity to locate the conditions
under which debureaucratization, overbureaucratization, or both
these organizational changes take place. Thus, we would expect
debureaucratization to occur more often in relatively isolated settlements of new immigrants than in immigrant communities
within the larger cities. In the isolated settlement the bureaucrat
is far more dependent on the voluntary co-operation of his clients,
both for the performance of his task and for his social and emotional (i.e. nonbureaucratic) well-being. One would also expect a
greater dilution of the bureaucratic role with the teaching role in
situations where a community of immigrants is transplanted more
or less at the same time, compared with situations where migration
was stretched over a long period of time. Under the former conditions, the immigrant community will have had less opportunity
to educate itself and to develop the leaders, intermediaries, and
interpreters who permit the bureaucrat to play his role uninterruptedly. In both the isolated immigrant community and in the
transplanted immigrant community, the "segregated"equilibrium
between the organization and its environment is likely to be more
upset, and hence more marked organizational change may be
anticipated. In both these cases, one might argue that the direction of change might well be toward greater, rather than lesser,
bureaucratization in the sense that the organization has a unique
opportunity to impose itself on more aspects of its clients' lives
than is usual. Our hypothesis holds otherwise, as we have tried to
argue above, but the plausibility of the competing hypothesis
illustrates how the two ostensibly opposite directions of organizational change stem from closely similar conditions.
Our study will enable us to make other comparisons, too. For
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example, we can compare bureaucrats who come into contact with
clients of their own ethnic origin with bureaucrats whose clients
are not of their own group. We can compare bureaucrats who are
relatively isolated from contacts with their colleagues-instructors
who live in the villages-with those who live among their colleagues in the newly built Rural Centers and commute daily to
the nearby villages. In the same way, we can compare the pattern
of official-client relations characteristic of the bus companies whose
drivers have only sporadic and brief contact with their new
immigrant clients to the behavior of bureaucrats in organizations which require more extended contacts.
Again, it is easier to choose the situations in which deviation
from the ideal bureaucratic norm is more likely to occur than it is
to predict the direction of the deviation. Thus, when the bureaucrat is confronted primarily by clients of his own group he is likely
to move either in the direction of bureaucratic formalism, studiously seeking to demonstrate his rootedness in Israeli life and to
resist the particularistic expectations of the relative newcomers to
Israel, or he may move in the direction of debureaucratization in
the sense of reaccepting portions of the pattern of traditional
authority and behavior of which he was once a part. Compared
to the bureaucrat dealing with members of his own ethnic group
(who may, because of his better understanding of the group, be
more successful in his task), the bureaucrat without an ethnic affiliation with his clients will display more affective neutrality, though
this may still lead to overbureaucratization. Again, we expect to
find that bureaucrats in close touch with their colleagues can maintain a more detached, objective, service-oriented attitude to their
clients than bureaucrats dependent on their clients for social and
emotional acceptance and interaction. And, for the same reason,
we expect bureaucrats with more extended contacts with a given
group of clients to depart from the norms of bureaucratic behavior
to a greater extent than bureaucrats with relatively brief and less
regular contact.
In this report of preliminary observations on the contact
between Israeli organizations and the mass immigration from nonWestern countries into Israel in recent years, we have tried to
formulate an approach to the study of organizational change, par-
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ticularly to change in the official-client relationship in response to
this new kind of clientele.
Contrary to the expectations of classical sociological thinking,
we have considerable impressionistic evidence pointing to a process
of decreasing bureaucratization, at least in the relations between
immigrant-clients and those parts of the bureaucracy which come
into contact with them. We have tried to explain this finding by
reference to the constraints operating on the bureaucrat who
comes into contact with the public to train the immigrant client
to perform the client role in order that he (the bureaucrat) may
perform his own role adequately.
It seems to us that this process implies a certain kind of dependence on the client as far as the bureaucrat is concerned. Specifically, the bureaucrat is dependent on the client's proper performance of the client role, although in a different sense than the client
is dependent on the bureaucrat's performance of his. Beyond this,
the kinds of situations we are exploring include those where the
bureaucrat may look to his client for sociability, or may recognize
him as a member of the same ethnic group, or may seek to enlist
his client in other organizations of which he is a member. All these
exemplify situations of heightened dependence and, presumably,
greater deviations from bureaucratic norms.
We have tried to suggest that the various forms of dependence
which we found to be related to the process of debureaucratization
may be subsumed under the more general heading of the articulation of role relations in modern society. The bureaucrat-client
relationship is presumed to be segmented in certain ways from
other kinds of social relations. Variations in the degree to which a
given role relationship is insulated from other role relationships
affects the degree of its bureaucratization. Thus, the process of
debureaucratization may be characterized as an impinging of nonbureaucratic roles, or of other bureaucratic roles, on the specific
bureaucratic role in question, while overbureaucratization may
be expressed either in terms of the artificial insulation of the
bureaucratic relationship from all other roles (however relevant)
or, in its more totalitarian form, in the impinging of the bureaucratic relationship on relations not relevant to the bureaucratic
role.
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We have tried to set down some theoretical guidelines for a discussion of the problems of organizational change, with specific
reference to the official-client relationship in a situation where
there has been a rapid influx of immigrants having little previous
contact with formal organization. We have tried to show that, in
Israel, the process of decreasing bureaucratization is not an uncommon response in this situation, although we wish to emphasize
that both increasing and decreasing bureaucratization may find
simultaneous expression in different parts of the organization and,
sometimes, in the very same relationship between official and
client. It remains for the pilot study now in the field and the
projected full-scale study to substantiate the general approach
and the specific hypotheses we have proposed.

